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NOTES
Stone v. Lynch: North Carolina Takes a Different
Approach to Defining Gift
The value of property acquired by gift is excluded from taxation by both the
federal and North Carolina income tax statutes.I But neither statute defines the
word "gift."2 Cases interpreting "gift" as used in the federal statute are legion;
3
the leading interpretation is the United States Supreme Court's decision in Com-
missioner v. Duberstein.4 The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, did not
attempt to define the word "gift" as used in the state income taxation statute
until 1985.
In Stone v. Lynch 5 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the ques-
tion whether strike benefits could be excluded from taxable income as gifts under
the state income tax statutes. A divided court held that the benefits were gifts.
6
The Stone court rejected the definition of gift established in Duberstein,7 which
focuses on the transferor's intent, in favor of the common-law definition of gift,
1. Under federal law gross income is defined as "all income from whatever source derived"
except as otherwise provided by statute. I.R.C. § 61 (1982). The Internal Revenue Code excludes
from gross income, and thus from taxation, a number of items, including amounts received as gifts.
Id. § 102(a). Thus, the full benefit of the exclusion depends on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. For
example, assume that a taxpayer with a marginal tax rate of 50% receives a gift of $1000. The
taxpayer would owe an additional $500 in taxes if the gift were included in gross income. Because
the gift is excluded from income, the taxpayer realizes an after-tax benefit of $500. A taxpayer with
a marginal tax rate of 30% would realize an after-tax benefit of only $300 from the same transaction.
The Code also provides taxpayers with relief in the form of tax credits. In contrast to exclu-
sions, tax credits provide for direct offsets against taxes owed by the taxpayer. The benefit to the
taxpayer does not depend on marginal tax rates, but is the same for all taxpayers. A taxpayer who
owes no taxes does not benefit from a tax credit unless the credit can be used to offset future income
or to cause a rebate of taxes previously paid. An example of a tax credit available under the current
Code is the credit for child care expenses. See id. § 44A (1982 & Supp. 1983). For a general discus-
sion of how tax is computed, see B. BITER, L. STONE & W. KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
39-45 (6th ed. 1984).
The North Carolina income tax statutes follow a similar pattern and contain an all-inclusive
definition of gross income, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-141(a) (1983), and an exclusion for amounts
received as gifts. Id. § 105-141(b)(3). As with the federal statutes, the benefit of the exclusion de-
pends on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. The state statutes also provide for various tax credits to
be taken as direct offsets against taxes owed by the taxpayer. Id. §§ 105-151 to -151.16 (1983 &
Supp. 1984).
2. Nor does the history of the exclusion provide an explanation or justification of its existence.
A "review of the theory and legislative history of the gift exclusion clearly indicates that the exclu-
sion is not the product of a reasoned legislative choice and does not reflect, with any reasonable
degree of precision, any legitimate objective of tax policy." Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income
Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift," 48 MINN. L. REv. 215, 260 (1963).
3. See e-g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Commissioner v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243 (1956); Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952); Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302
U.S. 34 (1937); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
4. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
5. 312 N.C. 739, 325 S.E.2d 230 (1985).
6. Id. at 744, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
7. Id. at 742, 325 S.E.2d at 232-33. The Duberstein court rejected the idea that the word gift,
as used in the income tax statutes, was to be given its common-law definition. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
at 285.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
which focuses on the presence or absence of consideration.8
The Stone court's adoption of a definition of gift that differs from the fed-
eral definition may confuse taxpayers in North Carolina. Further, the definition
the court adopted raises serious equitable concerns. This Note analyzes the rea-
soning underlying the Stone decision and discusses its implications. It concludes
that the Stone court could have reached the same result using the Duberstein
test, thus avoiding the potential problems created by the decision.
At issue in Stone were strike benefits received in 1979 by plaintiff taxpayer.9
Stone was an employee of Carolina Telephone and Telegraph (CTIT). In Sep-
tember 1979 Stone joined Local 3685, a recently formed local of the Communi-
cation Workers of America.10 Later that month the union voted to strike the
CTT plant.1 ' Stone participated in the strike by picketing and by serving as a
strike counselor for the union.12 The strike ended on November 29, 1979, and
Stone subsequently returned to work.13
The union established a "Defense Fund" to reimburse members for ex-
penses incurred as a result of the strike and to provide assistance in paying cer-
tain bills.14 Members seeking assistance were required to complete an
application setting forth the extent of their financial obligations. Members were
also required to list the specific items for which they were seeking assistance.
Decisions about assistance were based on this information, and assistance was
only available for necessities such as shelter, utilities, fuel, food, and medical
payments. Sixty days after the strike began assistance was also available to pre-
vent repossession of furniture, household appliances, and automobiles. Assist-
ance was not available for payments on "luxury items" such as color televisions
and stereo sets.15
Stone applied for assistance and received a total of $1,879, which he used to
buy food and to pay utility, household, and medical expenses. 16 He reported the
money as nontaxable income on his tax return for 1979.17 The North Carolina
Department of Revenue disagreed with Stone and held him liable for additional
tax on the benefits. Stone paid the additional tax and promptly filed for a re-
8. "The definition of 'gift' is broader than the definition used for federal income taxation pur-
poses which was first enunciated in Commissioner v. Duberstein." Stone, 312 N.C. at 742, 325 S.E.2d
at 232. A common-law gift is a "voluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously and
without consideration," but "[i]n tax law, a payment is a gift if it is made without condition, from
detached and disinterested generosity, out of affection, respect, charity or like impulses ......
BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 350-51 (5th ed. 1979).
9. Stone, 312 N.C. at 739, 325 S.E.2d at 231.
10. Id. The union was formed in February 1979. Stone joined the union in September 1979,
but did not start paying dues until the end of November 1979.
11. Id.
12. The record indicates that union members were not required to participate in the strike. Id.
at 743, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
13. Id. at 739, 325 S.E.2d at 231.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 739-40, 325 S.E.2d at 231.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 740, 325 S.E.2d at 231.
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fund.18 The trial court, apparently applying the Duberstein definition of gift,
found that the benefits were taxable income rather than a gift from the union.19
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the ground that
the supreme court had rejected the Duberstein definition in an earlier decision.20
The supreme court subsequently affirmed, holding that the word "gift" is to be
given its common-law definition under the state income tax statute.2
1
The federal and state income tax statutes use virtually identical language
with respect to the taxation of gifts. 22 Both simply state that the value of prop-
erty acquired by gift is excluded from taxation.- As a general rule, state courts
have found that decisions interpreting federal statutes are very influential in in-
terpreting state statutes with identical language.23 In Blackmon v. Mazo 24 the
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that it was free to turn to federal decisions for
aid in construing a state taxation statute identical to the federal statute.25 Simi-
larly, the California Court of Appeals in Rihn v. Franchise Tax Board 26 noted
that interpretations given to federal statutes by federal courts were highly per-
suasive when interpreting identical state statutes. 27
Although such federal decisions are persuasive, they do not control the
state courts. In Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors28 the North Carolina
Supreme Court noted that its interpretation of the state constitution was not
controlled by United States Supreme Court interpretations of an identical term
in the United States Constitution.29 By its own admission the Stone court did
not reach the question of what weight should be given interpretations of identi-
18. Stone paid the tax plus interest and a penalty. It was only after the matter could not be
resolved administratively that Stone initiated litigation to recover the funds. Id.
19. Id.
20. Stone v. Lynch, 68 N.C. App. 441, 445, 315 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1984) (citing Foreman Mfg.
Co. v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 504, 507, 135 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1964)), aff'd, 312 N.C. 739, 315 S.E.2d 230
(1985).
21. Stone, 312 N.C. at 742, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
22. Except for minor differences, the language used by the federal and state income tax statutes
is identical. The federal law states that "[gross income does not include the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." I.R.C. § 102(a) (1982). The North Carolina stat-
ute states that "[t]he words gross income do not include. . . [t]he value of property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise or descent .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-141(b)(3) (1983).
23. See generally Federal Ins. Co. v. Oakwood Steel Co., 126 Ga. App. 479, 191 S.E.2d 298
(1972) (federal cases interpreting summary judgment rule may be used to interpret state summary
judgment rule); Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 126 S.E.2d 442 (1962) (federal cases
interpreting summary judgment rule may be used to interpret state summary judgment rule).
North Carolina cases are in accord with this proposition. See Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980) (appropriate to look at cases interpreting Federal
Trade Commission Act when interpreting similar state statute); Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503,
239 S.E.2d 574 (1977) (federal interpretations of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are instructive in
supplementing North Carolina decisions), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978).
24. 125 Ga. App. 193, 186 S.E.2d 889 (1971).
25. Id. at 196, 186 S.E.2d at 891.
26. 131 Cal. App. 2d 356, 280 P.2d 893 (1955).
27. Id. at 360, 280 P.2d at 895-96.
28. 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
29. Id. at 474, 206 S.E.2d at 146. The Georgia Supreme Court in Superior Pine Prods. v.
Williams, 214 Ga. 485, 106 S.E.2d 6 (1958), noted that even when statutes were identical, a decision
by a federal court on point, although strongly persuasive, was not binding on the Georgia courts. Id.
at 491, 106 S.E.2d at 11.
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cal federal statutes. 30 It did note, however, that "generally it is preferable that
state taxation statutes be interpreted consistently with their federal counter-
parts."' 3 1 Despite this observation, the Stone court adopted a definition of gift
that directly conflicts with the definition in Duberstein.32
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Duberstein involved two
cases, Commissioner v. Duberstein and Stanton v. United States.33 The taxpayer
in Duberstein was president of the Duberstein Iron and Metal Company. For a
number of years the taxpayer's company did considerable business with Mo-
hawk Metal Corporation. Over the course of time, Duberstein developed a per-
sonal relationship with Berman, the president of Mohawk. In addition,
Duberstein provided Berman with information about a number of potential cus-
tomers. The information proved helpful, and Berman decided to send Duber-
stein a Cadillac. After some resistance, Duberstein accepted the automobile.34
The taxpayer in Stanton was an employee of the Trinity Church in New
York City.35 When he resigned after ten years of employment, the directors of
the Trinity Operating Corporation, a wholly-owned church subsidiary of which
Stanton was president, adopted a resolution giving him a "gratuity" of
$20,000.36
The United States Supreme Court synthesized various tests and concepts
used in earlier decisions to establish a definition of gift in Duberstein.37 The
Duberstein definition requires the fact finder to focus primarily on the intent of
the transferor.38 A gift under Duberstein springs from a "'detached and disin-
30. After asserting that its decision was in accord with federal and state law, the court stated,
"[We do not reach the question of whether principles of federal taxation law must or must not be
followed when a state taxation statute is identical or substantially similar to a federal taxation stat-
ute." Stone, 312 N.C. at 745, 325 S.E.2d at 234.
31. Id.
32. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
33. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 280-81.
34. Id. at 281. Mohawk apparently deducted the value of the car as a business expense on its
corporate income tax return. Because Mohawk considered the transfer a business expense, it was
more difficult for Duberstein to argue that the transfer was a gift. If the Code permitted Mohawk to
deduct the value of the car while allowing Duberstein to exclude its value, the value of the car would
completely escape taxation. Taxpayers, however, may have valid business reasons for making gifts,
and a deduction may be warranted. The current Code takes this possibility into account and states
that business expense deductions shall be allowed for gifts made to any individual to the extent the
value of the gift does not exceed $25. I.R.C. § 274(b)(1) (1982). As a result, small gifts are deducti-
ble as business expenses to the transferor and excludable as gifts to the transferee. In addition,
§ 274(b)(1) identifies various transfers that the transferor does not treat as gifts, including: (1) any
item costing less than four dollars on which the name of the taxpayer is clearly imprinted and which
is one of many identical items distributed by the taxpayer; (2) a sign or display rack to be used on the
business premises of the recipient; and (3) an item of tangible personal property given to an employee
in recognition of length of service, productivity, or safety achievement, but only to the extent the cost
of the property does not exceed four hundred dollars.
35. Stanton, 363 U.S. at 281.
36. Id. at 281-82.
37. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956) (gift in the statutory sense proceeds from
detached and disinterested generosity); Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952) (gift pro-
ceeds out of affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses); Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302
U.S. 34 (1937) (critical consideration in determining gift is transferor's intention); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make
payment does not establish it as a gift).
38. "'What controls is the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been
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terested generosity' ",39 and arises out of "'affection, respect, admiration, char-
ity or like impulses.' "4 Thus, a voluntary transfer made without consideration,
although a gift under the common law, may not constitute a gift under the taxa-
tion statute.
4 1
The Stone court elected not to follow the Duberstein decision. Rather, the
court held that under state taxation statutes a gift is defined as a "'voluntary
transfer of property by one to another without any consideration therefor.' "42
The Stone court thus adopted the broader common-law definition of gift rejected
by the Duberstein court.43 The Stone court established a simple three-prong test
for gifts: (1) there must be a transfer of property; (2) the transfer must be volun-
tary; and (3) the transfer must be made without consideration. 44 Applying the
test to the facts before it, the court had little trouble finding that the benefits
Stone received were a gift;45 there was a transfer, the transfer was voluntary, and
it was made without consideration. The union did not require Stone to partici-
pate in the strike,4 6 and any moral obligation the union had to pay the benefits
was not legal consideration. 47
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Stone relied on its earlier decision in
Foreman Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson.48 At issue in Foreman Manufacturing
was the cancellation of a $70,654 debt owed by the corporate taxpayer to a
shareholder.49 The court had to determine whether the cancellation of the debt
was taxable income under state income tax statutes.5 0 The court held that the
cancellation was a contribution to capital and thus was not subject to taxation. 51
The Foreman Manufacturing court had relied partly on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. American Dental Co. 52 to support its
decision. In American Dental, which was decided seventeen years before Duber-
made.'" Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 286 (quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 45 (1937)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
39. Id. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
40. Id. (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
41. Id. The determination whether a transfer constitutes a gift is primarily for the fact finder.
On appeal, courts must give great deference to this determination and must not disturb it unless it is
clearly erroneous. Id. at 290-91. In adopting its definition of gift, the Duberstein court rejected the
government's argument that it should establish a definition whereby gifts would be defined as trans-
fers of property made for personal rather than business reasons. Id. at 284. The government's test
would have eliminated the possibility of receiving a gift from a corporation, as corporations are
incapable of personal acts.
42. Stone, 312 N.C. at 743, 325 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting Foreman Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 261 N.C.
504, 507, 135 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1964)).
43. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
44. Stone, 312 N.C. at 743, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
45. Id. at 742, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
46. "The record is clear that the union did not demand or require that Mr. Stone perform any
service for it in order to be eligible to receive strike benefits." Id. at 743, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
47. Id.
48. 261 N.C. 504, 135 S.E.2d 205 (1964).
49. Id. at 504, 135 S.E.2d at 206.
50. Id. The corporation also suffered a $48,575 loss during the same year. The Department of
Revenue claimed that the loss was offset by the cancellation of the debt, and thus the corporation
received a taxable gain of $22,078. Id. at 506, 135 S.E.2d at 207.
51. Id. at 507, 135 S.E.2d at 208.
52. 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
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stein, the Court held that the release by creditors of an obligation owed by the
corporate taxpayer was a gift to the corporation.53 Relying on American Dental,
the Foreman Manufacturing court stated that when a stranger forgives a debt
owed by a corporation, the resulting benefit to the corporation is a gift. 54 The
court noted that the value of property acquired by gift is excluded from both
state and federal tax. The court also noted that a gift is "usually defined" as a
voluntary transfer of property "without any consideration therefor." s5  A con-
tribution to capital by a stockholder increases the resources of a corporation,
however, and the Foreman Manufacturing court reasoned that the business as-
pects of such a transfer remove it from the realm of gifts.56 The court held that
when a shareholder forgives a debt owed by a corporation, the shareholder has
made a contribution to capital, which is not subject to taxation under the North
Carolina income tax statutes.57
The Stone court reasoned that because the Foreman Manufacturing court
had relied on American Dental, it had "tacitly rejected" the Duberstein definition
of gift.5 8 The Stone court added that the Foreman Manufacturing decision es-
tablished that "gift" was to be given its common-law definition under state
law.59 Thus, the court reasoned that it was simply applying established prece-
dent in reaching its decision.
Although the Stone court based its decision on state law, it also stated that
its decision was in compliance with federal law. 60 It cited the United States
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Kaiser61 to support the proposition
that strike benefits need not constitute taxable income under Duberstein.6 2 The
taxpayer in Kaiser was employed by the Kohler Company in Wisconsin. 63 The
bargaining group at the Kohler plant was Local 833 of the United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America.64 Kaiser was not a
member of the union but elected to picket and otherwise participate in the
union's strike against Kohler. It was the policy of the union to provide financial
assistance to strikers in need. Kaiser applied for and received food vouchers and
rent payments totaling $565 from the union. At trial, the jury determined that
the benefits were a gift, but the judge entered a judgment non obstante verdicto
against the taxpayer. The court of appeals reversed the trial judge, and the
53. Id. At issue were debts owed by the corporate taxpayer, including back rent and interest
owed on merchandise purchased by the corporation. Due to adjustments made in the debts, the
taxpayer was the beneficiary of over $25,000 in cancelled debts. The Court, noting that the cancella-
tions were gratuitous, held that they were gifts under the federal income tax statutes. Id. at 331.




58. Stone, 312 N.C. at 742, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
59. "[Foreman] Manufacturing Co. is strong precedent to apply the common-law definition of
gift for income taxation purposes." Id.
60. Id. at 744, 325 S.E.2d at 233.
61. 363 U.S. 299 (1960). Kaiser was decided on the same day as Duberstein.
62. Stone, 312 N.C. at 744, 325 S.E.2d at 233-34.




Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. 65 The court in Stone concluded
that because its decision was in accord with Kaiser, it did not have to decide how
much weight to give decisions interpreting identical federal statutes.6 6
In a dissenting opinion in Stone, Justice Meyer argued that the majority
had reached an erroneous and unwise decision due largely to its misinterpreta-
tions of Foreman Manufacturing and Kaiser.67 He noted that Foreman Manu-
facturing stood only for the proposition that a contribution to capital was not
taxable under state law and did not establish that forgiveness of the debt consti-
tuted a gift.68 For that reason, he argued that it was inappropriate to apply the
"definition" of gift in Foreman Manufacturing to all situations. 69
Justice Meyer also argued that the majority read too much into Kaiser.70
He argued that Kaiser stands only for the proposition that the determination
whether a transfer constitutes a gift is for the fact finder. In Kaiser the facts
were sufficient to permit the fact finder to find that the strike benefits were a
gift. 71 In support of his position, Meyer noted that courts in every "strike bene-
fit" case since Kaiser had held that the benefits were taxable income.72
Justice Meyer argued that "common sense" dictated that the state court
adopt the Duberstein definition because the state statute was obviously copied
from the federal statute.73 He noted that any other decision would lead to con-
fusion on the part of taxpayers and practitioners. In sum, Justice Meyer argued
that the court was free to adopt the Duberstein definition and should have done
so. Had it done so, it would have been obligated to affirm the trial court's deter-
mination that the strike benefits were taxable income.74
The dissenting opinion notwithstanding, the Stone court could have found
the benefits to be a gift without rejecting Duberstein. The United States Supreme
Court's decision in Kaiser established that strike benefits could be characterized
65. Id. at 300-03.
66. See supra note 30. By relying on Kaiser to support the contention that its decision was in
accord with federal law, the majority ignored the fact that Kaiser was decided in conjunction with
Duberstein. The United States Supreme Court in Kaiser simply incorporated the Duberstein inter-
pretation of gift into its decision. Thus, while the Stone decision may have been in compliance with
respect to the tax treatment given the strike benefits, the decision was not in accord with the inter-
pretation of gift used in Kaiser. Only by adopting the Duberstein definition of gift could the Stone
court correctly argue that its decision was in accord with Kaiser.
67. Stone, 312 N.C. at 746, 325 S.E.2d at 235 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 747, 325 S.E.2d at 235 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 748, 325 S.E.2d at 236 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer noted that the facts in Kaiser did not require a
jury to find that the transaction was a gift.
72. Id. at 749, 325 S.E.2d at 236 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer's opinion cited Woody
v. United States, 368 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1966); Placko v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 452 (1980); Colwell
v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 584 (1975); Brown v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 399 (1967) (acq. 1969-1 C.B.
21), aff'dper curiam, 398 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1065 (1969); and Hagar v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 468 (1965).
73. "N.C.G.S. § 105-141(b)(3) did not spring from our General Assembly full-grown and unre-
lated to anything that had occurred before." Stone, 312 N.C. at 746, 325 S.E.2d at 235 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 747-49, 325 S.E.2d at 235-36 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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as a gift under Duberstein.7 5 Although it is true that courts in all of the subse-
quent strike benefit cases have held otherwise, 76 even these decisions recognize
the possibility that strike benefits might be characterized as a gift. These deci-
sions identify a number of factors to be considered in making such a determina-
tion, including: (1) whether the union was under a legal or a moral duty to pay
the benefits; (2) whether the financial status of the recipient was considered;
(3) whether the recipient was a member of the union; and (4) whether the use of
the benefits was restricted.77
The strike benefit cases emphasize that the key factors in finding a gift are
whether the union considered financial need and whether use of the benefits was
restricted. In Placko v. Commissioner7 8 the United States Tax Court held that
benefits received by the taxpayer constituted taxable income. The taxpayer in
Placko was employed as an airline pilot, and he and twenty-four other pilots
were laid off in response to a strike called by the union. The union voted to
assess each member fifteen dollars for six months to establish a fund to assist laid
off employees. The funds were distributed to the laid off pilots, but no effort was
made to determine their finpncial needs. Although the court recognized that the
benefits technically were not strike benefits, it employed a similar form of analy-
sis. 79 The court's determination that the benefits were taxable income was based
largely on the union's lack of inquiry into the financial need of the recipients.
The court noted that such benefits are generally treated as income "if calculated
without regard to financial need or made with no restrictions on use." 80
The taxpayer in Colwell v. Commissioner 81 was employed as a stereotyper
and was a member of the International Stereotypers and Electrotypers Union.
He received over $5,000 in benefits after he refused to cross the picket line dur-
ing a strike called against his employer by a different union. Colwell performed
no duties during the strike, and the benefits he received were not restricted as to
use.82 Further, the union paying the benefits did not inquire into Colwell's fi-
nancial state. Because the union made the payments without inquiry into finan-
cial need and without restriction on use the court determined that the benefits
were taxable income.8 3 Courts in the other strike benefit cases reached similar
conclusions.8 4
75. Speaking about the strike benefits, the United States Supreme Court stated: "We can
hardly say that, as a matter of law, the fact that these transfers were made to one having a sympa-
thetic interest with the giver prevents them from being a gift." Kaiser, 363 U.S. at 304.
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. Colwell v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 584, 587 (1975).
78. 74 T.C. 452 (1980).
79. Id. at 457.
80. Id. at 455.
81. 64 T.C. 584 (1975).
82. Id. at 585.
83. Id. at 588.
84. In Woody v. United States, 368 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1966), the taxpayer was a member of the
Stereotypers and Electrotypers International Union, and he received over $5,000 in strike benefits
from the union. The taxpayer was not required to participate in strike activities to qualify for bene-
fits, and the union made no inquiry into financial need. The court cited this lack of inquiry as a key
factor in its decision not to disturb the jury's determination that the benefits were taxable income.
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The Stone court could have relied on these cases and on Duberstein to sup-
port a finding that the benefits were a gift. Under Duberstein a trial court's
characterization of strike benefits as taxable income or a gift is to be disturbed
only if it is "clearly erroneous." 85 Arguably, the trial court's finding that the
benefits paid in Stone were taxable income was clearly erroneous. Kaiser and the
subsequent strike benefit decisions establish that such benefits can, on appropri-
ate facts, be characterized as gifts. The facts in Stone presented an ideal situa-
tion for such a determination because Stone received assistance only after
establishing a need, and the union benefits could be used only for necessary
items. 86 The trial court apparently disregarded these facts.87 Thus, the supreme
court could have affirmed the trial court's use of Duberstein, but reversed the
trial court's determination that the benefits were taxable income.
A finding in Stone based on Duberstein and the strike benefit cases would
not have been inconsistent with the state supreme court's decision in Foreman
Manufacturing. Foreman Manufacturing in no way established a definition of
"gift"; indeed, that question was not even before the court. The Foreman Manu-
facturing court was asked only to determine whether the forgiveness of the debt
was a contribution to capital, and if so, whether the contribution was subject to
taxation under state statutes. The court's only reference to the definition of gift
was dictum,8 8 and the Stone court was incorrect in citing it as binding precedent
in interpreting the word "gift." The Stone court was also incorrect in stating
that the Foreman Manufacturing court, by quoting American Dental, had re-
jected the Duberstein definition of gift. The Foreman Manufacturing court relied
on American Dental only for the proposition that the cancellation of a debt owed
by a corporation to a creditor should be characterized as a gift. 89 It did not rely
on American Dental for the purpose of defining "gift." 90
"The jury could reasonably infer that the payments were not gifts because the amount was not
determined according to personal financial need." Id. at 672.
In Brown v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 399 (1967) (acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21), aff'd per curiam, 398
F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1065 (1969), a number of airline pilots sought to have
strike benefits declared nontaxable gifts. The benefits received by the pilots ranged from $2,415 to
$7,511. Id. at 405. Determining that the benefits were taxable income, the court distinguished the
facts before it from those in Kaiser. "Here the payments were made irrespective of need and irre-
spective of other sources of income, and without any restrictions as to use." Id. at 409.
The taxpayer in Hagar v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 468 (1965), was employed as a copy editor
with the Globe-Democrat Publishing Company. He was a member of the St. Louis Newspaper
Guild, Local.No. 47 of the American Newspaper Guild. Id. at 469. He received $436.70 in strike
benefits while participating in a strike against his employer. Id. at 482. In denying the taxpayer's
claim that the benefits were a gift, the court focused on the fact that the union did not pay benefits to
individuals who did not participate in the picketing. Id. at 485. The court was "convinced that the
motivating force behind the payments here involved proceeded from the anticipation of economic
benefit both to the local guild and to the petitioner." Id.
85. See 363 U.S. at 290-91; supra note 41.
86. See supra text accompanying note 15.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 15 & 19.
88. The court simply noted: "A gift is usually defined as a voluntary transfer of property by
one to another without any consideration therefor." Foreman Mfg., 261 N.C. at 507, 135 S.E.2d at
208 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 507, 135 S.E.2d at 208.
90. In American Dental, the Court was asked to determine whether cancellation of the tax-
payer's debts was a gift or taxable income. In finding that the cancellation was a gift, the Court did,
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Deciding that the Stone court was not bound to apply the common-law
definition of gift to reach the result it desired does not determine what definition
the court should have adopted. The obvious choice is the Duberstein definition,
but this definition is not without its problems. As the United States Supreme
Court noted, the definition "may not satisfy an academic desire for tidiness,
symmetry and precision." 9 1 Rather, it is a vague definition that requires the fact
finder to determine the transferor's intent in making the transfer. This determi-
nation is to be based on the fact finder's "experience with the mainsprings of
human conduct."' 92 Not surprisingly, this definition has received substantial
criticism.9 3
The definition adopted by the Stone court is simpler and promises to be
easier to apply. The question whether a transfer was made with consideration
lends itself to a more objective determination than does an inquiry into the
transferor's intent. Under Stone, the fact finder need determine only whether
the transferor received legal consideration for the transfer. If not, the transfer is
a gift, regardless of any moral obligation on the part of the transferor. By con-
trast, the fact finder in a Duberstein inquiry must delve into the transferor's
psyche to determine if the transfer was made with "detached and disinterested
generosity."
Although the Stone definition promises easier application than Duberstein,
the court's rejection of Duberstein creates several potential problems. The Stone
decision results in different definitions of a key term in identical statutes. Tax-
payers and practitioners thus must apply different rules and standards to the
same transactions, making tax planning difficult. Although the Stone court rec-
ognized that state income tax statutes should be interpreted consistently with
their federal counterparts,94 the majority apparently went out of its way to avoid
following this "rule."95 The court could have argued that the confusion for
taxpayers and practitioners would be outweighed by the relative administrative
ease of its simplified definition of gift. Instead, the majority neither considered
the potential problems created by its decision nor offered compelling support for
its definition of gift.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the decision is the court's failure to
to a certain extent, define the word "gift" as used in the income tax statutes. First, the Court noted
that the plain meaning of the word "denotes. . . the receipt of financial advantages gratuitously."
American Dental, 318 U.S. at 330. In addition, the Court noted that "[tlhe fact that the motives
leading to the cancellations were those of business or even selfish. . is not significant." Id. at 331.
By focusing on the transferor's intent, the Duberstein court apparently rejected the American Dental
definition. Duberstein did not, however, explicitly overrule American Dental.
91. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 290.
92. Id. at 289.
93. See, eg., Klein, supra note 2, at 222 (noting that the aftermath of Duberstein is likely to be
similar to the confusion created by earlier decisions); Note, Federal Income Taxation: Non-Taxable
Gift Versus Taxable Compensation, 39 N.C.L. Rv. 286, 293 (1961) (noting that even after Duber-
stein there is no clear definition for "gifts" and "compensation" as used in the Internal Revenue
Code).
94. See supra text accompanying note 31.
95. "While paying lip service to this principle the majority has gone far out of its way to avoid
following it here." Stone, 312 N.C. at 746, 325 S.E.2d at 235 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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consider the equities involved in adopting such a broad definition of gift. One of
the primary goals of any tax system is fairness. 96 As Justice Meyer's dissent
pointed out, a basic question exists about the fairness of excluding strike benefits
from taxation.9 7 The Stone majority ignored this question and focused only on
the nature of the transaction.
Other troubling equity questions arise from the range of transactions that
might satisfy the Stone definition of gift. For example, tips, employee bonuses,
and similar transactions could constitute gifts under the Stone definition. Such
transfers are voluntary, and they arguably are made without legal consideration.
These transfers could be distinguished from the payments in Stone because they
are a form of compensation, but the possibility that they might satisfy the Stone
definition of gift is troubling.
Other transactions will be more difficult to distinguish from Stone. The
transfer of the car in Duberstein is an example. By requiring the fact finder to
ascertain the transferors's intent, the Duberstein definition makes it possible to
determine that such a transfer constitutes taxable income. It is more difficult to
reach the same conclusion under the Stone definition. This fact raises additional
questions about the impact Stone will have on the state's tax base. As with other
equity issues, the Stone majority did not address these questions.
Adopting the Duberstein definition would not have eliminated all of the
problems associated with the nontaxation of gifts. The Duberstein definition is
admittedly difficult to apply. Adopting the Duberstein definition, however,
would have eliminated the problems associated with applying different defini-
tions under identical statutes. The Duberstein definition also would have pro-
vided fact finders with greater flexibility to address the equity questions raised by
such determinations by allowing them to look to the intention of the transferor.
This flexibility is not available under the common-law definition, which allows
the courts to determine only whether the transfer was made with legal consider-
ation. The Stone majority, in a poorly reasoned and unsupported decision,
adopted a much broader definition of gift. The court could and should have
adopted the Duberstein definition of gift.
DWIGHT F. HOPEWELL
96. "One important goal of a good system of taxation must be fairness. Fairness is generally
divided into two sub-categories, horizontal equity and vertical equity. The principle of horizontal
equity is that people similarly situated should be treated alike. B. BrrrKER, L. STONE & W.
KLEIN, supra note 1, at 12.
97. Stone, 312 N.C. at 749, 325 S.E.2d at 236. "Mr. Stone's right to join in the strike is an
important right but the mere fact that an individual chooses to join in a strike should not provide
him with a tax shelter." Id. The federal strike benefit cases also have not addressed this question.
See supra note 84.
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